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The Implementation Challenge of Mitigating
China's Greenhouse Gas Emissions
TSEMING YANG*
INTRODUCTION

With the growth of the developing world's population and economies, limiting
the global increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions has grown in
significance. The parties to the U.N. Climate Change Convention acknowledged
this reality in the Bali Action Plan, which calls for "nationally appropriate
mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable
development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacitybuilding, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner."'
The Bali Action Plan does not impose new obligations. It does create a
negotiation framework for a post-Kyoto agreement and engages the developing
world, especially major greenhouse gas ("GHG") emitters, such as China, in
discussions about binding emission limits. However, beyond the imperative of
involving developing countries in binding commitments, little consideration has
been given to what this would entail, especially for China.
The essay provides an overview of the challenge of mitigating China's
greenhouse gas emissions. Part I of the essay provides background on China's
significance to the problem. Part II will review China's recently released
"National Climate Change Programme," its national strategy to address climate
change, as well as some key initiatives to mitigate carbon emissions. Part III will
turn to the Climate Plan's shortcomings with respect to environmental sustainability and effectiveness. Part IV will discuss the uncertain prospects of China's
ability to implement the Climate Plan effectively through its. existing regulatory
policies and institutional structures. Part V suggests some options for addressing
these issues.
*Gaining a better understanding of these issues provides a window into the
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; Director of Vermont Law School-Sun Yat-sen University
Partnership for Environmental Law in China, a program supported with funding from the U.S. Agency for
International Development. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author alone and should not be
attributed to U.S. AID or the U.S. government. I am grateful to Gu Dejin and Jiao Bo for providing me with
many valuable insights on China's environmental laws, John Echeverria and other participants at the
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review's workshop for their useful comments, and Quoc
Nguyen and Bill Eubanks for helpful research. © 2008, Tseming Yang.
1. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, Bali
Action Plan para. I(b)(ii), Decision I/CP.13, U.N. Doc. FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (March 14, 2008) availableat
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop 13/eng/06a0l .pdf.
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prospects of legally binding emissions commitments by China. More importantly
for those engaged in practical and constructive efforts to engage China on climate
change, the paper suggests areas where assistance may be most worthwhile.
I. CHINA'S SIGNIFICANCE TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE EFFORTS

China has become a primary focus of discussions about involving developing
nations in mitigation efforts because of the size of its population and its rapid,
double-digit economic growth. According to a recent inventory of the International Energy Agency ("IEA"), China was the world's second-largest source of
fossilfuel energy-relatedgreenhouse gas emissions in 2005, with 5060 mega tons
of carbon dioxide, just after the United States, which released 5817 mega tons.2
With total worldwide fossil fuel emissions running at 27,136 mega tons carbon
dioxide,3 the U.S. and China were responsible for 21.4 percent and 18.6 percent
of global-C0 2 emissions, respectively. 4 Both were far ahead of the energy-related
emissions of Russia, Japan, and India, distantly ranked third through fifth, with
individual emissions at just about a quarter of those levels. 5
Earlier estimates had predicted that China would not become the world's
largest GHG emitter until the end of the decade. However, the very latest
estimates of the LEA indicate that China surpassed the United States already in
2007.6
Of course, annual national emissions do not provide the whole picture about
climate change responsibility and opportunities for mitigation. Historical contributions and per capita emissions are also critical considerations. For example, in
2000, each United States citizen contributed on average 24.3 tons of CO 2 per
person while those in China released just 3.9 tons CO 2 per person. 7 Those
2. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 2007 at 50, 56 (2007). The last official figures for
China's overall GHG emission inventory are for '1994, filed with the UNFCCC in 2004, and amounted to 3650
mega tons C02. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NATIONAL COMMUNICATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 27 (2004),
availableat http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/Filel75.pdf.
3. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 2, at 48.

4. China's own most recent comprehensive estimate of all of its greenhouse gas emission (fossil fuel
combustion and other sources) put the 2004 total at 5,600 mega tons of C02 equivalent, if land use, land use
changes, and forestry activities (LULUCF) are included, and 6,100 mega tons of C02 equivalent, if LULUCF
are excluded. NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N, CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 6 (2007),
available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/P020070604561191006823.pdf. By comparison, US net GHG

emissions were 6.4 g tCO2 (per UNFCC data).
5. Id. (Russia at 1544 megatons, Japan at 1214 megatons, and India at 1147 megatons).
6. Shai Oster, China Seems Poisedto Pass U.S. as Top Greenhouse-Gas Emitter,WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2007,
http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB117735208071379218.html. According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, China became the world's greatest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2006. Press Release, Neth.
Envtl. Assessment Agency, China Now no. 1 in C02 emissions, USA in second position (June 19, 2007)
available at http://www.mnp.nllen/service/pressreleasesl2007/index.html (click on title); see also China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 20, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2007/06/20/business/emit.php.
7. World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), http://cait.wri.org.
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numbers ranked the U.S. seventh and China ninety-ninth in the world.8 With
respect to historical contributions to current atmospheric carbon dioxide levels,
Western Europe and North America have contributed the lion's share of emissions. The shift of much manufacturing activity to China, which exports many
goods to the U.S. and Western Europe, means that the industrialized world is also
indirectly responsible for a large portion of China's carbon footprint.
Nevertheless, China and other developing countries have important stakes in
controlling anthropogenic GHG emissions. Sea-level rise, changes in climate and
weather, and adverse effects on ecosystems and public health will be felt by both
the industrialized and the developing world regardless of who contributed to the
problems. In fact, the consequences of climate change will affect the poorest
populations and developing nations much more than wealthier communities and
the industrialized world. 9
In the past, China has been reluctant to discuss binding international commitments to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, it is pursuing a
number of policies that seek to accomplish that very goal. The chief efforts have
focused on energy efficiency and conservation, renewable energy resources,
industrial restructuring, and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean
Development Mechanism.°
The initiatives present significant mitigation opportunities in the world's
now-largest GHG emitter. Unfortunately, mitigation opportunities in China have
also led to a sentiment that if only China were to commit internationally to curb
its GHG releases, the need for the industrialized world to reduce emissions
sharply over the coming decades might not be as urgent. The reality is not as rosy.
Even if China were to adopt significant and binding GHG emissions, there are
serious concerns about how they would be implemented and whether such targets
could be effectively achieved. First, China's continued overwhelming focus on
economic development objectives, which runs through China's climate programs, raises questions as to whether its policies can promote environmental
sustainability. Second, the weakness of China's existing environmental regulatory infrastructure and legal institutions put into doubt its ability to limit GHG
emissions effectively.

8. Id.
9. Andrew Revkin, U.N. Warns of Climate-Related Setbacks, N.Y. ThMEs, Nov. 28, 2007; U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME, HUmAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008 - FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLDARrrY IN A
DIVIDED WoRLD. China's National Communication under UNFCCC article 4(1)0) and article 12 sets out a range
of possible adaptation measures to meet the impacts of climate change, ranging from ensuring water availability
in the ard north to increasing height of dikes closer to the cost. See People's Republic of China, Initial National
Communication on Climate Change 66-71 (2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/
chnncle.pdf.
10. Joanna Lewis, China"s Strategic Priorities in InternationalClimate Change Negotiations, WASH. Q.,

Winter 2007-08, at 155, 159-165.
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II. CHINA'S CLIMATE PLAN AND KEY GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION EFFORTS

China's official program related to climate change was most recently set out in
a paper released by the National Development and Reform Commission in June
2007. The much anticipated "National Climate Change Programme" ("Climate
Plan") created a new National Leading Group to Address Climate Change,
headed by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The Leading Group's purpose was to
elevate the issue to the highest governmental levels."l More importantly, it sought
to articulate a national strategy that includes both mitigation and adaptation
measures.
China's mitigation strategy has focused primarily on the energy sector,
especially energy efficiency and conservation, industrial processes, and renewable energy projects, while also taking advantage of the opportunities presented
by the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism. 12 It also plans to
"establish [by 2010] a suitable and high-efficiency institutional and management
framework to address climate change in the future."' 3
Energy efficiency and conservation are being targeted as important opportunities for GHG mitigation because "out-of-date processes and technologies still
occupy a relatively high proportion of China's key industries, [resulting in
overall] energy efficiency [that] is about 10% lower than that of developed
countries."' 14 "Production of energy-intensive products requires about 40% more
energy than 'the advanced international level."' 15
To achieve the energy-related goals, the Plan relies heavily on the eleventh
five-year plan (2006-2010) requirement that energy consumption per unit of GDP
be reduced by 20 percent by 2010 (compared to 2005). The goals are to be
accomplished primarily through changing "economic growth pattern," energy
conservation and efficiency, and technological modernization. 16 The aim is
integration of "climate change policy with other interrelated policies" including
"energy structure optimization." 1 7 In other words, the central government has
sought to integrate the climate change program with its overall economic policy.
Ongoing energy efficiency and conservation efforts include the phase-out of
inefficient coal-fired power plants and replacing them with more efficient and
cleaner-burning facilities, mandates related to vehicle fuel economy standards,
and efficiency efforts related to the electric transmission grid. The overall effect
has been to reduce the energy intensity of China's economy.
China has also promoted renewable energy resources, such as wind farms,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

NDRC, supra note 4, at 56.
Lewis, supra note 10, at 155, 159-165.
NDRC, supra note 4, at 29.
Id. at 20.
Id.
NDRC, supra note 4, at 26. The Plan also calls for the reduction of major pollutants by 10 percent.
Id. at 25.

HeinOnline -- 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 684 2007-2008

2008]

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGE IN CHINA

hydro-electric facilities, and solar, geothermal, and biomass projects as a top
priority. By 2010, it expects hydropower development to contribute up to 500
million tons of CO 2 reductions; nuclear power about 50 million tons in CO 2
reductions; more efficient coal-fired power plants about 110 million tons in
reductions; utilization of coal-bed methane and coal-mine methane about 200
million tons of reductions; biomass energy about 30 million tons; and wind, solar,
geothermal, and tidal energy resources to contribute up to 60 million tons in
reductions. 8
Adaptation under the Climate Plan targets agriculture, forests and other natural
ecosystems, water resources, and coastal zones and regions.1 9 The specific
measures include improvement in water-saving irrigation methods, breeding
stress-resistant crop varieties, prevention of desertification, limiting logging in
existing forest resources, enhancing water storage infrastructure, speeding up the
construction of the south-to-north water diversion project, building of dikes, and
improving shore protection. 20 Like its mitigation policies, however, most of the
adaptation programs are designed to coincide with ongoing agricultural policies
and resource management programs.
Opportunities for foreign investment and the financial benefits of carbon
trading have led China also to take advantage of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean
Development Mechanism ("CDM") as another key climate initiative. 21 The
CDM is a project-based mechanism which allows investors to sponsor facilities
or programs in developing countries to avoid greenhouse gas emissions that
would otherwise have occurred in the absence of the project.22 Since developing
countries like China do not have greenhouse gas emission limits under the Kyoto
Protocol, the avoided emissions generate a set of carbon credit that can be traded
and used by industrialized countries to satisfy their Kyoto Protocol Annex B
emission limitations.

18. Id. at 32-34. China's Climate Plan also refers to its population control policies as having made important
contributions to limiting GHG emissions. Id. at 11. Given that most greenhouse gas emissions are directly or
indirectly tied to energy use by or for consumers, population control has a significant effect in curbing energy
demand and therefore greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, China's government indicates that the 300 million births
averted by its family planning policies by 2005 resulted in 1.3 billion tons of averted C02 emission.
19. Id. at 47-52.
20. Id.
21. Lewis, supra note 10, at 155, 159-65.
22. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 12, Dec. 10, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). A project to construct a hydro-electric power facility that would replace an existing fossil
fuel power plant could generate carbon credits in the amount of the avoided carbon dioxide emissions because
those carbon emissions will no longer be released into the atmosphere. The hydro-power facility has made the
fossil fuel power plant unnecessary. Determination of the appropriate number of credits generated are made by
the Kyoto Protocol CDM Executive Board, which supervises all aspects of the CDM, including eligibility,
methodology of credit determination, and verification processes. See generally U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto
Protocol FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 1, (March 30, 2006), Annex to Decision 3/CMP. 1, at para. C, availableat
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/COPMOP/08aO l.pdf.
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One of the primary purposes of the Kyoto Protocol's CDM provision was to
assist industrialized nations fulfill their Annex B obligations by reducing GHG
emissions in the developing world. 23 Since developing nations, including China,
still rely heavily on relatively dirty and energy inefficient technologies, there are
opportunities for significant and relatively cheap emission reductions. Thus,
CDM projects in China can generate greenhouse gas emission credits at a lower
cost than the existing market-price for carbon credits elsewhere and create
opportunities for profit.
The primary environmental benefit of CDM projects lies in the transfer of
clean development and low GHG-emission technology to countries such as
China. Since virtually all of the credits generated are likely to be transferred and
used for Annex B compliance purposes, the mechanism will arguably result in
negligible net reductions in short-term global GHG emissions. Nevertheless, the
CDM has the potential to create infrastructure that can support substantial
reductions of such emissions in the long-term future. By demonstrating the
environmental benefits and economic feasibility of cleaner technologies and
approaches, CDM projects are expected to set China and other developing
countries on a path toward economic development that produces fewer carbon
emissions in the long-run and is more environmentally sustainable. 24
Kyoto's CDM program has allowed credits to be banked since 2000. China's
involvement gained momentum only after 2004, however, when it first promulgated national regulations governing approval of CDM projects in China.25 As of
January 1, 2008, China was serving as host to 147 CDM Board registered
projects. 26 The projects range in focus from renewable energy ventures, such as
windfarm, hydropower, and biomass facilities to reforestation, methane recovery,
and industrial waste gas destruction, such as decomposition of HFC and N20.
Not surprisingly, China, the largest developing country, is one of the leading
nations with respect to the hosting of CDM projects. Its developing economy
presents many opportunities for energy efficiency improvements and pollution
reduction. In terms of the sheer number of projects, as of January 2008, China
hosts the second largest number of CDM projects registered (and approved) by
the CDM Board: 16 percent of all projects.2 7 Only India, with 35 percent of all

23. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 22, art. 12(2).
24. Id.

25. See Interim Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in
China (June 2004). The Interim Regulations have been superseded. See Measures for Operation and
Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China (effective Oct. 12,2005), art. 26, available at

http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=905 [hereinafter Measures].
26. Data on CDM throughout this Article was obtained from the UNFCC CDM website, http://cdm.unfccc.intl
index.htni (CDM data from January 1, 2008 on file with author) [hereinafter CDM data]. As this issue was
going to press in August, 2008, the number of registered CDM projects hosted by China had grown to 254.
rd
h
27. Id. Brazil and Mexico were a relatively close 3 and 41 with 13% and 11% of projects, respectively. Id.
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projects, hosted a larger number.2 8
Altogether, CDM projects hosted in China are expected to generate carbon
credits that, if annualized for 2008-2012, would amount to 91 million tons of
carbon-equivalents per year.29 By comparison, the total annual number of carbon
credits for 2008-2012 for all CDM projects world-wide amounted to 188 million
tons. 30 Thus, China currently accounts for 47 percent of total CDM carbon credits
usable during the 2008-2012 commitment period.

III.

THE

CLIMATE PLAN'S SHORTCOMINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY
AND EFFECTIVENESS

The hope that China might be able to contribute significantly to limiting the
rise of global greenhouse gas emissions, however, must be tempered by at least
two serious concerns about the substantive implementation of the Climate Plan.
First, the environmental sustainability and effectiveness of the policies set out in
the Climate Plan are questionable. Second, China's approach to implementing the
Clean Development Mechanism could undermine the very purposes of the
Mechanism.

A.

CONTINUED DOMINANCE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH PRIORITIES

The most pervasive influence in this regard is the continuing dominance of
economic growth priorities over environmental protection and public health
concerns. Even though China's programs related to climate change are encouraging, they appear to be significantly biased towards economic growth.
First, climate change policy is within the jurisdiction of the central government's National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC"), China's
designated national authority for purposes of the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change. Since the NDRC is one of China's leading and most powerful
government agencies, placement of the issue there has elevated China's climate
change policy to the highest governmental levels.3"
The NDRC's primary policy focus, however, has been on promoting China's
economic development and transition toward a market-oriented system. It suggests that climate change policies are first and foremost seen as economic

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. China recently restructured its central government into a set of "super-ministries." Highlightsof China's
InstitutionalRestructuringPlan, XINHMA NEws AGENCY, Mar. 15,2008, availableat http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2008-03/15/content_7797293.htm. Among other government reshuffling, the reforms resulted in the
formal elevation of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), China's equivalent to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, to full cabinet status as the new Ministry of the Environmental Protection.
However, the long-term effects remain unclear. Many documents still refer to the State Environmental
Protection Administration.
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development policies. The trouble with this is the government's long-standing
bias against strict environmental regulation--environmental quality considerations have generally been secondary to economic growth imperatives. 32 Thus,
energy efficiency, energy conservation, and industrial modernization have been
justified as a set of no-regrets measures 33 that will ultimately result in net benefits
regardless of the actual effects of climate change.
The consequences of such a perspective can be seen in China's determined
pursuit of nuclear power as a means of meeting the energy demands of its
economy. While nuclear power may be a zero carbon emission energy source,
serious concerns remain about long-term disposal of spent fuel and long-term
environmental sustainability.34 Of course, the support of some well-known
Western environmentalists gravely concerned about the overwhelming long-term
threat of global climate change has given nuclear power new currency worldwide
as a potentially acceptable alternative to fossil fuels.3 5
For China, however, the significance of nuclear power lies primarily in its role
as a component of an energy security strategy designed to avoid shortages of
energy that could otherwise hamper the rapidly growing Chinese economy. 36 In
other words, such policies are designed with an eye primarily toward cost and
security of energy supply, and only secondarily with a view toward reducing
environmental impacts, especially concerns about global climate change. 37

32. In fact, while the Ministry of Environmental Protection (formerly SEPA) is involved climate change
issues, there is no formal office with responsibility for climate change issues. Discussion with senior SEPA
official, Dec. 15, 2007.
33. See e.g., Zhou Dadi, Environmental Considerationsin the Development of China, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 221,229-230 (1992).
34. NDRC, supra note 4, at 32; see also ROBERT E. EBEL, CHINA's ENERGY FuTuRE 66-68 (2005).

35. See James Lovelock, Nuclear Power is the Only Green Solution, INDEPENDENT, May 24, 2004, available
at http://comment.independent.co.uk/commentators/article6l727.ece; David R. Baker, Nuclear Backers' Energy Surges, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 2006, at Dl.
36. The fragility of China's energy infrastructure was highlighted recently by the serious energy shortages
and transportation disruptions caused by the wave of serious winter storms and unusually cold weather in
central China. Klaudia Lee and Cary Huang, Powerplantsfeel the pinch as mainlandweather crisis worsens, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at 1. For example, up to 800,000 migrant workers were stranded in the
Guangzhou train station and unable to return to their home provinces and towns for the Chinese new year
holidays because of electricity shortages Ivan Zhai, Tempers Fray as Number Stuck in Guangzhou Nears
800,000, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31, 2008, at 1. The city of Chenzhou, a city of 4.6 million people in
Hunan province, was left without power for nine days. Chloe Lai, In Frozen City, They Dream of a Shower, S.
CHINA MORNINO POST, Feb.3, 2008, at 1.

37. Like its mitigation plans, China's adaptation efforts are also largely based on a no-regrets approach. For
example, it is commonly known that water diversion projects such as the south-north water project, which will
bring water thousands of miles from watersheds in the south to the north to meet the tremendous growth in the
demand in the arid northeast, were being planned even before the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, yet they are listed as adaptation components of the Climate Plan. See, e.g., Liu Changming,
Environmental Issues and the South-North Water Transfer Scheme, in MANAGING THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT

185 (Richard Louis Edmonds ed. 2000). Ironically, China's most important adaptation effort, however, is not at
all designated as such in the Plan. Arguably, China's initiatives on energy efficiency, energy conservation, and
industrial modernization and its more general energy security policies are China's most comprehensive set of
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The question that such a regulatory policy framework raises is whether
policies focused specifically and primarily on climate change and greenhouse gas
emissions will be seriously considered. Furthermore, even if China formally
implemented such policies, would institutional design bias or even subvert the
projects?
B.

THE TROUBLING RECORD OF CHINA'S CDM PROGRAM

Putting an economic development focused ministry in charge of climate
change issues has also influenced the Clean Development Mechanism's implementation in China. The NDRC is the Designated National Authority for purposes of
the CDM. 38 Together with the Ministry of Science and Technology ("MOST"),
the NDRC also serves as the co-chair of the National CDM Board, which reviews
proposals for CDM activities within China.3 9 Jointly with the MOST and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MFA"), the NDRC has the authority to approve
CMD project activities. 4° The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP),
formerly the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), is a member of the CDM Board (together with also the Ministry of Finance, the Meteorological Administration, and the Ministry of Agriculture). Even though it is
involved in the review of proposals, it is excluded from the approval decision
41
itself.
China's implementation of the Kyoto Protocol's CDM program has clearly
been affected by this institutional arrangement. Of the worldwide number of
carbon credits expected to be generated by registered CDM projects, almost half
(47 percent) of will come from projects hosted in China. 42 Remarkably, of the
China-hosted projects, 60 percent of credits will be generated by nine HFC
incineration projects, each producing emissions reductions of two to ten million
tons of carbon-equivalents per year.43 By comparison, virtually none of the other
almost 140 registered CDM project hosted by China approaches even one million
credits annually. The vast majority of renewable energy and energy efficiency
adaptation measures. Energy security is designed to ensure steady economic growth, jobs and rising prosperity,
and social harmony, and as a result will provide China with more resources and resilience to respond to the
effects of climate change. In other words, greater prosperity and government resources will make it easier to
absorb climate change impacts. Given that policies promoting energy security are not necessarily consistent or
co-extensive with greenhouse gas mitigation, such policies could support continued reliance on coal or other
fossil fuels. It seems ironic that the very measures aimed at adaptation could potentially contribute to the
underlying problems of climate change.
38. Measures, supra note 25, art. 16.
39. Id. art. 15.
40. Id. art. 16.
41. Id.
42. CDM data, supra note 26.
43. Id. If two other N20 destruction facilities are included, producing 14 million credits, chemical pollution
destruction projects will account for close to 68 million credits or slightly over 75 percent of all China-based
registered CDM projects. Id.
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projects usually generate in the range of a few tens of thousands to a few hundred
thousand carbon credits.
The driving force behind these mega-CDM projects (in terms of carbon
credits), compared to the traditional renewable energy and energy efficiency
project activities, is the relatively cheap technology that can be put into place to
generate valuable carbon credits. Assuming carbon prices of US$10/ton, an
investment of a few million dollars could result in credits worth between
US$100-500 million over the course of Kyoto's five-year commitment period.
Even when the 65 percent tax on the revenue of such projects is taken into
account, such projects remain profitable investments.
Thus, the great majority of CDM credits generated in China come from a
handful of projects that are focused on chemical pollutant destruction, rather than
the development of renewable energy resources or energy efficiency improvements. To put this issue most starkly: eleven projects in China, accounting for just
1 percent of the total number of CDM projects, will generate 36 percent of all
annual CDM carbon credits in the world.' Without even questioning assumptions about the true equivalence of carbon credits generated by chemical
pollutant destruction processes with actual carbon dioxide emissions, the sheer
number of credits generated by a handful of relatively cheap projects raises
troubling concerns about the long-term value of such projects with respect to
climate change mitigation.
First, given the large disparity in profitability between HFC-23 projects and
that of traditional renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, the large
numbers of cheap carbon credits generated could depress the market price for
carbon credits. There seems to be a real risk that such mega-projects will siphon
off scarce CDM investment dollars from emission reduction activities elsewhere,
especially in other developing countries. 45 It could also reduce the incentives to
undertake more conventional GHG mitigation projects, such as development of
alternative energy resources. Conventional projects might be less economically
attractive; nevertheless, renewable resource development, energy efficiency
improvements, and the development of new technologies would speed up a
transition to an economy less dependent on fossil fuels. 46 Thus, investment
44. As of January 1, 2008, there were 890 world-wide projects generating 188 million credits annually. Id.
45. There is also the question whether China needs all of the CDM foreign investment dollars in the first
instance, given that one of the CDM's key functions is to promote sustainable development in the developing
world. China already has significant streams of foreign investment pouring into its economy and has significant
domestic capacity for investment in its economy. In contrast, Africa has had comparatively small amount of
CDM activity even though it arguably has had greater need for foreign investment to assist with economic
development and poverty alleviation. In fact, the efforts of the Chinese government to strengthen diplomatic
relationships with African countries in recent years by providing development aid and directing China's own
foreign investment to such nations bolsters this perspective.
46. Implementation of energy efficiency programs and renewable energy facilities also have the potential to
serve as demonstration projects show-casing their economic viability, environmental advantages, and desirability. In contrast, the HFC-23 destruction technology arguably is utilizable only in a relatively concentrated
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dollars targeting renewable energy sources or energy efficiency could have
environmental benefits promoting sustainable and cleaner development reaching
far beyond the short-term effect of generating carbon credits. The impact on
shaping the pathway of industrial development and technology adoption toward
long-term sustainability of energy consumption could be substantial.
As Michael Wara has also suggested, the unexpectedly large profits that can be
made from HFC destruction might provide perverse incentives to produce such
waste gases primarily for the carbon credits they generate rather than as a
by-product of actual demand for the associated good (HCFCs) that can be sold
for useful purposes in the marketplace. a7 The unintended consequence would not
only create unjustified windfall profits, but impede other efforts to mitigate GHG
emissions by diluting the value of CDM carbon credits.4a
Ultimately, the huge profits to be made from a few HFC-23 incineration
projects raise the question of whether the Kyoto Protocol parties might have been
much better off adopting the traditional environmental financing model. Under
the Montreal Protocol and the Global Environmental Facility model, direct
subsidy payments to China could have paid for such projects without distorting
the carbon market and at a price much closer to the actual cost of the pollution
destruction equipment. The international community and the Kyoto Protocol
parties could have captured the environmental benefit of such projects and
allowed scarce environmental investments to be directed to other emission
reduction opportunities with a greater need for foreign capital investment.
China has pledged in its CDM regulations to direct the 65 percent of the CDM
credits generated by HFC projects to support other activities on climate change. a9
However, how such money will be specifically used is still unclear. Plans are to
be formulated primarily by the Ministry of Finance and NDRC, though "other
relevant departments," presumably the Ministry of Environmental Protection,
will be involved.5 °

industry and has limited climate change-related application in other parts of the economy.
47. Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and Potential 28-31
(Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev. at Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 56, July 2006), available at
http://iis-db.stanford.edulpubs/2121 1/WaraCDM.pdf.
48. Id. at 28.
49. The "Clean Development Mechanism Fund [will] support the country's activities on climate change such
as climate change related science and technology research, and raising national adaptation and mitigation
capacity." NDRC, supra note 4, at 57. See also Measures, supra note 25, art. 24 ("to support the country's
activities on climate change such as climate change related science and technology research, and raising
national adaptation and mitigation capacity").
50. In the best case situation, such funds could help implement and subsidize other climate change programs
in China. However, given concerns about corruption and other weaknesses of China's environmental regulatory
system generally, it is unclear how effectively the Ministry of Finance will be in selecting worthy programs and
administering such a fund.
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IV. THE UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS OF THE CLIMATE PLAN'S REGULATORY
IMPLEMENTATION

In addition to concerns about the substantive effectiveness and environmental
sustainability of China's Climate Plan in contributing to global GHG mitigation
efforts, there is also considerable uncertainty about China's ability to implement
and ensure compliance with the Plan through its existing regulatory policies and
institutional structures. As experience with environmental regulation generally
has shown, compliance and cooperation with mandates to reduce energy use,
purchase energy efficient equipment, or install and operate climate friendly
equipment is unlikely to happen on a voluntary basis. Regulatory implementation
will be necessary, whether through the design of licensing, inspection, monitoring, and enforcement systems or through the provision of economic incentives.
China's Climate Plan anticipates these needs by providing, for example, that
China will "strengthen supervision and monitoring on energy conservation" with
respect to energy efficiency and conservation improvements. Such regulatory
steps will:
" phase out backward and energy intensive productions and equipments
according to the law... ;
" prohibit producing, importing, and selling products that fail to meet the
lowest energy efficiency standards, and forbid selling and using buildings
that fail to meet the energy-saving building design standards;
" strengthen the supervision and monitoring of energy utilization status of key
energy consumer entities;
" strengthen supervision of energy utilization status of energy intensive industries, government office buildings, and large-scale public buildings;
" strengthen the inspection of the implementation of energy efficiency standards for products, building energy-saving design standards and industry
design criterions. 5
The need to create or modify regulatory systems implementing the central
government's Climate Plan reaches even deeper. Regulations or new laws are
expected to mandate technologies or processes to be adopted by various industrial sectors.5 2 The Climate Plan also calls for the strengthening and improved
implementation of various environmental laws and regulations related to agriculture, forestry, and municipal wastes, 3 including strict control of land reclamation
activities in fragile ecosystems and prohibition of pasture destruction. 54
Unfortunately, China's track-record in implementing environmental and other

51. NDRC, supra note 4, at 36-37.
52. Id. at 39, 40 (saying, for example, that "coke ovens should be equipped with coke dry quenching
facilities," and "ethylene cracking furnaces with advanced technology shall be retrofitted").
53. Id. at 44-46.
54. Id. at 44.
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regulatory schemes advancing the public interest has not been good. Even though
China's environmental protection system is made up of a fairly extensive and
modem set of laws and regulations,5 5 based in large part on the systems of the
United States and Western Europe, it is poorly implemented and enforced.56
Other regulatory systems safeguarding consumer and worker safety suffer from
similarly deficient implementation and enforcement. 7
One illustration can be found in the difficulties China has faced in improving
environmental quality in anticipation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. As part of its
commitments to win the Olympic bid, China vowed to clean up the skies over the
city and reduce other pollution, making the city "as clean as Paris."58 China has
taken many steps to clean the air, with some substantive success. 59 However,
serious air quality issues remained until the beginning of the Olympics, when
drastic temporary measures, shutting down factories, stopping construction, and
keeping cars off the road, finally were effective in clearing the air.6° Some
athletes planned to take precautionary measure to ensure that pollution will not
seriously impair their performance and health.6 1

55. See Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested
Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 159, 161-62 (2006-07). See generally STATE ENVTL. PROT.ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS & REGULATIONS IN CHINA AND RULES OF WTO (Chinese-English Version) (2002).
56. Anecdotal evidence indicates that even when modem pollution control equipment has been purchased or
even installed, businesses may choose not to operate or turn off such equipment in order to save costs.
57. For example, a slew of media reports in 2007 exposed reliability problems related to China's food safety
system even though existing laws should have prevented incidents of contaminated toothpaste, adulterated pet
foods, and unsafe food products. The lack of effectiveness of China's regulatory system overseeing coal miner
safety, illustrated at times by weekly reports of mining disasters claiming tens and occasionally even hundreds
of lives, is an even starker example of the more general problem. Over 6,000 miners die annually in China's coal
mines, more than 100 times the rate of coal mining deaths in the United States. See Mure Dickie, World's
Riskiest Mines Claim 200 Lives, FIN. TIMES, Feb 16, 2005, at 10; Mure Dickie, Chinese Miners Learn to Live
with Danger,FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at 20. And while illegal and unsafe mines are shut-down all the time,
most of such mines re-open after the inspectors leave.
58. Zhu Baoxia, Nation Set to Further Cut Pollutants, CINA DAILY, Dec. 23, 2000. In fact, during the
evaluation of Beijing's bid for the 2008 Olympics, International Olympic Committee officials indicated that
they expected air and water quality "to be within WHO [World Health Organization] standards at all venues, and
in Beijing generally." INT'L OLYMPIC CoMM., REPORT OF THE IOC EVALUATION COMMISSION FOR THE GAMES OF
THE XXIX OLYMPIAD IN2008, at 62 (April 3, 2001). That appears rather doubtful at this point.
59. See Jim Yardley, Beijing's Olympic Quest: Turn Smoggy Sky Blue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at A 1;Jim
Yardley, China Reveals Backup Pollution Controls, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2008, at A6. Some argued that attempts
to improve air quality had led to a slower economic growth rate for July, 2008 (14.7 percent), but others were
skeptical. See Andrew Batson, "Are Clean-Air Measures Slowing China's Growth?," China Journal(Aug. 14,
2008) (last visited Aug. 14, 2008), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinajournal/2008/08/14/are-clean-air-measures-slowingchinas-growthl.
60. See Juliet Macur, Reviews of Air Quality Are Mixed, and So Is Attendance, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008
(noting praise from International Olympic Committee but also some dissenting views); Jim Yardley, More Than
Halfway Through the Games, a Rarityfor Beijing: A Breath of Fresh Air N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008, at A7.
61. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Olympic Teams Preparefor Dirty Air in Beijing, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2008, at Al.
The U.S. Olympic Committee prepared to bring some of the food American athletes consumed from the U.S. to
China, so as to avoid contamination problems. Ben Shpiel, Wary of Food, U.S. Olympians Plan a Big Delivery
to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at Al.
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Although the specter of athletes with breathing masks did not materialize with a few notable exceptions 62 - China's difficulty in meeting its promises are
not due to a lack of genuine desire and good faith.63 Instead, the reasons for these
failures are the result of deep structural and institutional deficits in the environmental regulatory scheme and system of governance. They are serious impediments to improving China's environment that even the edicts from the very top
leadership, without more, cannot readily overcome."
The obstacles to improving the effectiveness of China's environmental regulatory system can be broadly classified into four interrelated sets of issues. First,
there is "local protectionism" and a conflicting set of incentives that usually lead
local governments to choose economic growth and pollution over public health
and environmental quality considerations.
"Local protectionism" describes the tendency of government leaders to shield
local businesses from the burdens of environmental regulatory requirements,
including enforcement actions.65 Because promotions and bonuses for local
leaders, who are not politically accountable to local communities, have in the past
been based on their performance in meeting economic growth goals, local leaders
have commonly preferred economic growth and pollution over community
concerns about public health and the environment.6 6 More insidiously, corruption
and conflicts of interests due to financial ties with regulated businesses can result
in local protectionism. 67 The relatively low prestige and influence of environmental protection officials, compared to their economic development counterparts,

62. See Greg Bishop, When It Comes to Masks, Cyclists Are Still Apologizing, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/sports/olympics/13cycling.html (last visited Sep. 27, 2008). (describing
controversy over four members of U.S. cycling team).
63. In fact, the government has been reported to contemplate banning half of the city's cars and asking

various industries to shut down for the duration of the Olympic Games in order to improve air quality. See, e.g.,
Martin Zhou, Building Sites Orderedto Stop Work in Bid to Inmprove Games Air Quality, S. CHINA MORNING

POST, Mar. 13, 2008. Even if these efforts are successful, such actions are not a sustainable method of addressing
Beijing's poor quality.
64. While central* government ministries have recently been reshuffled, there appear to be no plans to
drastically alter the governance structures relevant to environmental regulation. Jim Yardley, China Retools Its
Government in a Rush for Efficiency, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 2008, at A12.
65. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP'N & DEV., CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 508-509

(2005); DALi L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEvIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 96-97 (2004).

66. There are exceptions, and some local EPBs are more progressive than others. See, e.g., ELiZABETH C.
ECONOMY, THE RIvER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENrAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S FTRnE 117-18 (2004).
67. While China has laws and regulations that prohibit corruption and try to forestall-self-interested behavior,
such issues continue to arise regularly. Periodic campaigns of the central government to root out corruption and
conflicts of interest have had only limited success. See generally YANG, supra note 64, at 217-258. See also JOHN
BRYAN STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA'S ECONOMY, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL STRUCrURE
139-141 (2001). The most recent example of high-level corruption was the conviction and execution of the head
of China's Food and Drug Administration. David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays his Cause, and Pays,

N.Y. TuMES, July 13, 2007, atAl.
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has exacerbated the problem of political interference.6 8
Apart from outside pressures, local environmental protection bureau ("EPB")
officials also face conflicting incentives with respect to regulatory enforcement
even though they are charged with protecting the environment and reducing
pollution. For example, the pollution discharge fee system arguably gives EPBs a
stake in the continuation of excess pollution discharges.6 9 Under the discharge
fee system, EPBs receive a portion of the fee paid by polluters for discharges in
excess of applicable standards, which are used in part to fund EPB activities. 70 As
a result, the pollution discharge fee. system has created a perverse incentive for
EPBs to allow excess pollution emissions. 71 The consequence is that environmental concerns often have to give way to economic considerations.
The second set of problems relates to the challenge faced by the central
government and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in controlling
the activities of local and provincial governments on environmental matters.
Even though MEP is formally vested with the central government's supervisory
authority on pollution related matters, it has had only limited success in getting
the EPBs of local and provincial governments to properly implement and enforce
national environmental laws and regulations.
MEP's weak ability to control the actions of local EPBs results from direct
local 72 governmental control over personnel management and budgets in the
respective EPBs as well as improper interference by other government agencies
and politicians. MEP may have general authority over the environmental laws
and regulations implemented by local EPBs, but the budgets and personnel of
local EPBs are under the direct control of the respective local governments. Thus,
hiring, firing, and promotions of EPB staff are controlled not by MEP but rather
by the respective local officials. Allegiance of EPB personnel is divided, affecting

68. See, e.g., Abigail R. Jahiel, The Organization of Environmental Protection in China, in MANAGING
CHINA'S ENViRONMENT 42-47 (Richard Louis Edmonds ed., 2000); XiAOYING MA & RICHARD ORTELLANO,
ENVIRONmENTAL REGULATIoN IN CHINA 80-82 (2000); see also Shi Jiangtao, Upgrade Gives Watchdog more
Clout in PollutionFight, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 13, 2008.

69. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa [Environmental Protection Law of the People's
Republic of Chinal, art. 28 (adopted on Dec. 26, 1989), translatedin CHINESEL. & Gov'T, May/June 2004, at58
[hereinafter Environmental Protection Law] ("Enterprises and institutions discharging pollutants in excess of
the prescribed national or local discharge standards shall pay a fee for excessive discharge according to state
provisions.").
70. MA & ORTELLANO, supra note 68, at 21-24, 122-26; State Council, Interim Measureson the Collectionof
Pollution Discharge Fee (Feb. 5, 1982), reprinted in STATE ENVIRoNmENTAL PROTECrnON ADMINISTRATION,
ENviRONMENTAL LAWS & REGULATIONS IN CHINA AND RULES OF WTO, 417 (Chinese-English Version) (2002).

71. See EcONOMY, supra note 66, at 111. There are provisions in other environmental regulatory systems that
appear to create disincentives for local government officials to protect environmental quality. Gu Dejin,
Presentation on The Centralization and Decentralization in Environmental Governance at the Environmental
Law Institute, Jan. 24, 2008 (unpublished transcript available with the Environmental Law Institute).
72. Provincial governments are commonly referred to and included as "local" governments, and hence the
term local governments and local EPBs should be seen as including provincial governments and provincial
EPBs, unless otherwise indicated.
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regulatory and enforcement decisions accordingly.73
From an American perspective, such difficulties seem surprising. Compared to
the U.S. federal system, where state governments are sovereigns unto themselves, China has a unitary governmental structure. Provincial and local governments derive their legal and governmental authorities from the central government
and are therefore responsible as Beijing's agents for implementation of national
laws. Unlike in the American federal system, local and provincial authorities
cannot assert governmental sovereignty as a basis for refusing to carry out
national legal mandates. Moreover, China's environmental laws and regulations
impose penalties for neglect of official duties.74 Therefore, local officials should
arguably be more responsive than their American counterpart.
Decisions andactions by local EPBs can be reviewed by MEP and potentially
altered. However, MEP does not have adequate financial and human resources to
supervise the day-to-day operations of local EPBs to ensure consistent implementation of national laws and regulations. Nor can MEP supervise industry compliance with environmental requirements by itself. MEP has 200-300 full-time
employees to supervise the thousands of local and provincial EPBs that manage
the environment for a population of 1.3 billion people.75 With respect to
enforcement matters, the number of staff directly assigned to that office numbers
approximately thirty. 76 By comparison, U.S. EPA has 17,000-18,000 employees
in Washington, DC headquarters and twelve regional offices, with hundreds of
staff involved in enforcement work.77
A third set of issues relates to China's deficit of democratic governance. China
remains a country that lacks open and fair elections, making government
officials, including their actions with respect to the environment, unaccountable
through democratic processes. At the same time, other avenues by which the
public can participate in environmental decision-making remain underdeveloped.

73. Many of these issues are not unique to China's environmental regulatory system, however. Attempts by
government officials to interfere with environmental regulatory and enforcement processes are common in
many countries, including in the U.S. The tension between efforts to protect the public health and the
environment and concerns about economic impacts surface regularly in policy debates and regulatory processes
across the world. Unfortunately, the overall set of incentives and pressures, including the design of specific
regulatory schemes, has made it much less likely that local EPBs will vigorously enforce national environmental laws. Gu Dejin, supra hote 71.
74. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Law, supra note 69, art. 45.
75. However, Daniel Guttman has pointed out, there are one to two thousand additional staff employed by
affiliated institutes, primarily involved in planning and education. Dan Guttman & Song Yaqin, Making
Central-Local Relations Work: ComparingAmerica and China Environmental Governance Systems, 1 FRONTIERS EIvrL. Sci. & ENGINEERING CHINA 418, at 427 (2007).

76. Personal communication with MEP official. There are also a couple of hundred staff in affiliated centers
working on enforcement matters.
77. Elizabeth Economy has suggested that this also true for local environmental protection bureaus more
generally. Elizabeth Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE
CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINAHLE DEVELOPMENT 102, 107 (Kristen Day ed., 2005). See also ECONOMY, supra note 66,

at 107.
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For example, the activities of environmental non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), which have been so important in many countries to asserting the
public's interest in public health and environmental protection, are strictly
controlled in China. China requires all NGOs to be registered and sponsored or
affiliated with a government agency. 78 The licensing requirement in essence
allows for governmental control and supervision of environmental organizations,
restricting what entities can be created or allowed to exist legitimately as well as
allowing for some supervision of their activities.
The policy limits the number of environmental NGOs and favors NGOs that
tend to focus on activities and issues unlikely to draw government scrutiny.
Involvement in controversial issues tends to be uncommon among Chinese
environmental NGOs. Organizations that focus on advocacy work, such as the
Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, in Beijing, are even more rare.
In recent years, government officials have come to accord a greater recognition
to public participation as an important priority within environmental law,
particularly with respect to environmental impact assessments.79 Much too often,
however, the public continues to have little ability to influence government
actions, short of staging widespread protests and expressing serious popular
dissatisfaction.8 °
The fourth set of issues is the weakness of the rule of law and supporting legal
institutions. China's environmental legal framework and institutions provide only
weak support to environmental NGOs or private individuals interested in engaging government agencies on environmental issues or in taking actions against
polluters. First, entities that would ordinarily support the development and
implementation of environmental law in other countries such as the U.S.,
especially the practicing bar, are largely absent in this field. Traditionally, the
leading law firms in China have not had practice specializations in environmental
law, not even environmental compliance work. 8 1 Without consistent and sustained government enforcement efforts, the opportunities for an environmental
bar to practice its trade will continue to be limited.
Second, the institutions of the law, especially the courts, lack independence. Of
course, unlike in theUnited States, the courts are not intended to be independent
institutions.82 Instead, like all other Chinese government institutions, the courts

78. As a result, such organizations are also commonly referred to as Government-organized Nongovernmental Organizations ("GONGOs").
79. See, e.g., Jesse Moorman & Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participationin China's
Environmental Impact Assessment Process: Comparing China's EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
281,284 (2007).
80. See Benjamin Kang Lim, Thousands Protest Against South China Chemical Plant, RUrFERs, June 1,

2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSPEK 112258.
81. According to one Chinese law student's summer research project in 2006, none of the top 40 Chinese law
firms had any environmental law practice.
82. For example, members of the federal judiciary are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
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are accountable and must report to the legislative bodies at each level of
government.8 3 Thus, the Supreme People's Court's actions are supervised by the
National People's Congress. Moreover, similar to some other civil law systems,
Chinese courts function much like bureaucratic administrative agencies. Judges
play roles more akin to civil servants than decision-makers with significant
independence and authority. They are subject to the authority of local governmental leaders, opening up the risk of the improper use of such power to influence
cases. 84 Judicial corruption remains a threat as well.8 5
Third, there continues to be a deficit in the substantive understanding of
environmental laws and the underlying policies among the environmental bar,
environmental officials, and the courts. In general, environmental law has been
and continues to be a disfavored specialty area within China's law schools.
Instead, commercial law or other legal fields that enable law graduates to engage
in lucrative law practices tend to be the most popular with students by wide
margins.86 Combined with few opportunities to practice environmental law, the
result is that lawyers tend not to develop an expertise in the area.
Among judges, lack of training focused on environmental law is exacerbated
oftentimes by a more general lack of training in the law. During the downsizing
of the People's Liberation Army some years ago, the courts were often a favored
destination for retired military officers, even for those who had no formal training
in law.87 Likewise, government positions in EPBs have at times been treated like
economic opportunities for government employment regardless of qualification,
rather than being openings for highly-trained professionals. However, legal
training among such employees has increased because of recognition that
environmental law expertise is an importance competency for such positions.
As currently drafted, China's Climate Plan relies heavily on the existing
environmental regulatory system to achieve its goals. If that regulatory system is
considered inadequate, that poses serious concerns for effective implementation.
Even with regard to energy efficiency and conservation policies and industrial
restructuring efforts, regulatory implementation and enforcement will be no less
important. As Professor Mingyuan Wang has pointed out, not only has implemen-

United States Senate. These federal judges, who hear the majority of the cases brought under federal
environmental legislation, have the authority to independently overrule unlawful actions by either of the other
co-equal branches of the federal government.
83. In that sense, China resembles a parliamentary governmental system.
84. See Jerome Cohen & John Lange, The Chinese Legal System: A Primerfor Investors, 17 N.Y.L. ScH.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 345, 351 (1997).
85. See, e.g., Margaret Y. K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIATS OF
THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 169-70 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000).
86. In addition, China's legal system still allows the practice of law based primarily on passage of a national
bar exam, even without formal study of law. Environmental law is an unlikely area for self-study lawyers to

focus on.
87. See, e.g., ECONOMY, supra note 66, at 113.
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tation and enforcement of past energy-related legislation 88 been inadequate, but
similar concerns continue to plague the most recently enacted energy legislation,
the 2005 Renewable Energy Law. 89 There are serious deficiencies related to the
legislation's lack of specificity and "incompleteness" of the regulatory design.
But there are also more familiar problems of democratic governance, the
weakness of the rule of law and its supporting institutions, corruption and conflict
of interest, and local protectionist tendencies that are analogous to the traditional
environmental regulatory context. 90
V. POSSIBILITIES

FOR MEETING THE CHALLENGES

These issues present very serious challenges to the accomplishment of environmental goals by the central government. Because the difficulties are grounded in
institutional deficiencies, solutions need to address such weaknesses of institutional culture and capacity.
The primacy of economic development objectives, which has led officials to
put economic growth ahead of environmental quality and public health concerns,
has turned climate change policy into an energy security and supply policy. 91
Reversing the tendency of government policies to under-value the potential
long-term consequences for environmental health and natural resource harm will
require far-reaching changes in institutional culture and beliefs. In effect, China's
climate change policy must be transformed or acquire much more of the
characteristics of an environmental and public health policy.
At the same time, capacity building and institutional reform is still necessary
with respect to China's environmental regulatory system. For example, expanding the teaching of environmental law in Chinese law schools, along with training
programs for lawyers, judges, and government officials, could make a significant
difference with respect to the lack of knowledge and understanding of governing
environmental legal principles among the practicing bar, judges, and government
officials.92
88. Electric Power Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 28, 1995, effective
Apr. 1, 1996), ISINOLAw (last visited Aug. 11, 2008) (P.R.C.);. Energy Conservation Law of the People's
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Nov. 1, 1997, effective Jan. 1,
1998).
89. The Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong, effective Jan. 1, 2006).
90. Wang Mingyuan, Issues Related To The Implementation Of China'sEnergy Law: Analysis OfThe Energy
Conservation Law And The Renewable Energy Law As Examples, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 225 (2007).
91. For the first time in China's history, pollution reduction goals have been incorporated into China's most
recent 5-year Plan, which calls for 10% reduction of major air and water pollutants released nationwide. China's
Main Targetsfor 2006-2010, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlbizchinal2006-04/14/
content_567934.htm. However, it remains to be seen how effectively this mandate will be implemented.
92. The court system could be affected relatively quickly by such an approach because most judges are hired
and promoted like other government civil servants. As a result new judges tend to be new or recent law school
graduates.
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The overall impact of such training would increase the capacity of the bar and
the courts to properly handle environmental cases when they arise. With respect
to EPB staff, training could also improve and professionalize environmental law
implementation and enforcement. The outcome could be both greater consistency
with, and fidelity to, the applicable regulatory scheme. Most importantly, however, increased levels of implementation enforcement would result in a greater
demand for environmental legal services and cases that would in turn spur
demands on the practicing bar and improve the familiarity, and eventually the
expertise, of the courts in environmental matters. China's regulatory system will
also need to realign the incentives of polluters and local environment EPB
officials to protect the environment and carry out national regulatory and legal
mandates.
Other challenges may be more difficult to address. MEP's financial and human
resources are inadequate to properly supervise thousands of local EPBs or to
manage the pollution and environmental degradation problems when local EPBs
fail to do SO. 9 3 Despite its reluctance, China's central government will ultimately
have to endow MEP with a much greater set of financial and human resources.9 4
China will also need to provide judges with greater independence from undue
influence by other officials and the parties so as to assure the integrity of judicial
decisions. While the issue is representative of larger concerns about the rule of
law, it is of special importance to environmental cases. In their nature, environmental disputes usually implicate not only the concerns of particular injured
victims but also the larger public interest in environmental quality and a set of
diffuse public health impacts. At the same time, the targets of environmental law
claims are usually made up of entities with concentrated economic interests. The
result is that the dynamics of litigating environmental cases raises public choice
and collective action issues that tend to bias outcomes in favor of polluters. A
neutral and independent judiciary is thus crucial to ensuring an outcome that
protects the public interest.
Finally, NGOs and other civil society organizations (including universities and
other educational institutions), need greater independence from governmental
control in order to play a Significant role in protecting the environment and
holding polluters and the government accountable for their actions. Yet, relinquish-

93. The authority to punish local officials for neglecting their duties has generally has been of little
effectiveness in part because such punishments are inconsistently imposed. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 67, at
139-141.
94. There have also been suggestions for "verticalization" of control over local EPBs. Verticalization would
mean putting the budgets and personnel directly under the control of MEP and eliminate conflicting loyalties of
EPB staff and ability to manipulate EPB activities by local government officials. See Gu Dejin, supra note 71.
The effect would be to put the activities of local EPBs under direct control of SEPA, in effect "nationalizing"
what have traditionally been local government officials. Such a change would have to come with a wholesale
shift of revenue from local governments to the central government in order to ensure appropriate funding of
local EPBs.
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ing control over NGOs, by, for example, abolishing licensing requirements,
would also mean allowing such organizations to challenge official policies. Not
surprisingly, the Chinese government has been reluctant to decrease governmental oversight.
Institutional concerns about China's implementation of any future GHG
emission limits also suggest an important area of activity for the U.S. and other
industrialized nations. In addition to negotiating with central government and
foreign affairs officials about the need of China to take on formal GHG emission
limits, governments should also engage China directly in the regulatory implementation of any commitments or voluntary initiatives to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions. Such efforts will be difficult and require patience and persistence. But
they are likely to have much greater substantive effects and will be more
important than international agreements setting numerical emission targets.
CONCLUSION

Many of China's efforts, especially its energy conservation and efficiency
measures, are contributing to important greenhouse gas emission reductions.
However, very serious challenges lay ahead with respect to the "nitty-gritty" of
ensuring appropriate implementation of China's energy, environmental, and
CDM programs. Efforts focused on resolving such issues will make China's
ongoing climate change efforts and environmental regulatory system much more
effective. More importantly, reforms will also ensure China's ability to comply
with internationally binding emission limits, should China take on those commitments. Otherwise, even a successful Bali Plan negotiation leading to the inclusion of China among countries with fixed emission limits will be of limited value
and effectiveness.
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